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Abstract. In an exchange economywith a ﬁnite number of indivisible goods, we analy ze a
dynamic trading process of coalitional recontracting where agents may make mistakes with
small probability. We show ﬁrst that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed (mistake-
free) process consist of (i) all core allocations as absorbing states, and (ii) cycles of non-core
allocations. Next, we introduce a perturbed process, where the resistance of each transition
is a function of the number of agents that make mistakes –do not improve– in the transition
and of the seriousness of each mistake. If preferences are always strict, we show that the
unique stochasticallystable state of the perturbed process is the Walrasian allocation. In
economies with indiﬀerences, non-core cycles are sometimes stochastically stable, while
some core allocations are not.
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The problem of what outcomes will arise in decentralized trade amongst arbitrarygroups
of agents dates back to Edgeworth (1881). The solution is given bywhat todaywe refer
to as the core, i.e., the set of allocations that are immune to anycoalitional move that
improves upon them. Edgeworth’s verbal description of contracting and recontracting
was inherently dynamic, and it received elegant formalizations in the analyses of Feldman
(1974) and Green (1974).1 In contrast to these papers, ours considers the possibilityof
mistakes in agents’ decision-making within the context of dynamic coalitional exchange.2
Applying the tools developed in evolutionary game theory, our results will point out that
the core maysometimes not correspond to the right notion of stability , i.e., stochastic
stability, which incorporates the small probability of mistakes as a persistent feature of the
system.
Edgeworth (1881) proposed the core as an alternative to the competitive equilibrium
allocations, identiﬁed byWalras (1874), and was the ﬁrst to notice the connection between
the two in large economies. This observation gave rise to the important core conver-
gence/equivalence literature (Debreu and Scarf (1963), Aumann (1964)) as one of the
leading game theoretic justiﬁcations of Walrasian equilibrium.3
In Feldman (1974) and Green (1974), a dynamic random process was imposed on a
coalitional game. Starting from an arbitraryfeasible allocation, the process allows each
coalition to meet with positive probabilityin everyperiod. When a coalition meets, they
can choose to stayat the original allocation or move to a new allocation feasible for them
if theyall improve as a result. When this happens, the complement coalition is sent back
to their individual endowments (in Feldman (1974)) or to a Pareto eﬃcient allocation of
their resources (in Green (1974)).4 The adjustment of resources of the complement coalition
ensures that the path followed in utilityspace bythe process is not monotonic, and renders
the convergence question interesting and non-trivial. Both Feldman (1974) and Green
(1974) are able to identifysuﬃcient conditions under which Edgeworth’s recontracting
process converges to a core allocation.
In the present paper we analyze a dynamic recontracting process similar to those in
Feldman (1974) and Green (1974).5 The major diﬀerence, however, between our analysis
1One other aspect of dynamics and the core is provided by its dynamic non-cooperative implementation
(e.g., Perry and Reny (1994), Dagan et al. (2000)).
2Indeed, papers in cooperative game theory have no mistakes. We shall depart from this noble tradition.
3See Anderson (1992) and Aumann (1987) for surveys. Although the robustness of the equivalence
result is remarkable, several violations thereof have been identiﬁed, from which one can learn the role of
certain frictions in markets. These references include Anderson and Zame (1997) for inﬁnite dimensional
commodity spaces, Manelli (1991) for instances of satiation in preferences, and Serrano, Vohra and Volij
(2001) for asymmetric information.
4One interpretation of these dynamic processes is in terms of formation of trading blocks in an in-
ternational trade context. One can then identify patterns of autarchy, followed by the establishment of
long-lasting or short-lived trading unions, and so on.
5One small diﬀerence is that when a coalition recontracts, the complement is sent back to their indi-
1and that of Feldman-Green is that we allow agents to make “mistakes” in their recon-
tracting. When a coalition meets and engages in conversations regarding the possible
improvement upon the prevailing status quo, each agent may, with small probability, agree
to a coalitional trade from which he will not beneﬁt.
We investigate the stochastic stabilityof this recontracting process. This methodol-
ogy, based on the techniques developed for stochastic dynamical systems by Freidlin and
Wentzell (1984), was introduced to evolutionarygame theorybyFoster and Young (1990),
Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993); see also Young (1998) for a clear
exposition.6 The idea is to study the long run behavior of a dynamical system subject
to persistent random shocks. Persistent randomness ensures that the system does not get
stuck at anygiven state. Instead, it keeps transitting all the time from one state to the
next. Stochastic stabilitythen tells us which states are the ones visited bythe sy stem a
positive proportion of time in the verylong run.
In most applications to evolutionarybiologyand game theory , randomness in the sy stem
takes the form of mutations or instances of experimentation. The stochastic stability
results are then interpreted as the patterns of behavior selected byevolution in the long
run. In this paper, as in Ben-Shoham et al. (2000), randomness is identiﬁed with the small
probabilityof mistakes in decision making. Thus, an agent’s preferences do not mutate
or even change over time, but are part of the exogenouslyspeciﬁed primitives. Fixing the
preferences of the economyallows us to compare the stochasticallystable states to sets
of allocations prescribed byclassical solution concepts. Therefore, the interpretation of
the exercise performed here is simplyto get a sense of which allocations will be visited by
Edgeworth’s recontracting process a positive proportion of time in the long run if mistakes
are small probabilityevents that all agents make all the time.
Given the ﬁnite structure imposed bythe methodologybased on Markov chains, it is
convenient, and we shall do so here, to work with ﬁnite assignment or housing economies,
as introduced in Shapleyand Scarf (1974). When we analy ze the recontracting process free
of mistakes, we ﬁnd a large class of recurrent classes: each core allocation constitutes an
absorbing state, and in addition, we ﬁnd recurrent classes consisting of cycles of non-core
allocations.
In economies where preferences are strict, we are able to get a remarkable reﬁnement
of this set of predictions when we perturb the system with mistakes. Our ﬁrst main result
is that the unique stochasticallystable state of the recontracting process with mistakes
is the Walrasian allocation, provided that serious mistakes (those where agents end up
worse oﬀ as a result) are suﬃcientlymore costlythan minor ones (those where the agent
joins a coalition to end up indiﬀerent to how he started). At the heart of this result is
vidual endowments only if necessary for the recontracting move (that is, only if the redistribution of the
blocking coalition’s endowments is not also a redistribution of the commodities they get at the blocked
allocation.
6Other references for evolutionary game theory in general are Weibull (1995), Vega Redondo (1996)
and Samuelson (1997).
2the propertyof “global dominance” of the Walrasian allocation for this case, uncovered in
Roth and Postlewaite (1977): indeed, for everyfeasible allocation of the economy , there
exists a coalition that can (weakly) improve upon the status quo with their components
of the Walrasian allocation. This makes it easyto get to the Walrasian allocation from
anyother. In the process of coalitional recontracting, the blocking coalition will meet with
positive probabilityand get their components of the Walrasian allocation, while the rest of
the agents will reach it as an application of trading cycles (see Shapley and Scarf (1974)).
In doing this, the only“mistakes” to be made are agreeing to trades that leave one exactly
indiﬀerent. On the other hand, to go from the Walrasian allocation to anyother is much
harder, as it turns out that at least one agent will have to make a serious mistake and
agree to a trade that will make him worse oﬀ.
The conclusions of our analysis are quite diﬀerent in economies with indiﬀerences. We
provide a series of examples to illustrate that the predictions of stochastic stabilitywill
not coincide with anyof the classical solution concepts. In particular, we regard our
last example (Example 4) as the other main result of the paper: it shows that non-core
cycles are sometimes stochastically stable, whereas some core allocations are not. Thus,
in recontracting with mistakes, the economymayfrequentlyvisit coalitionallyunstable
cycles, while entire regions of the core will not be reached but a zero proportion of time in
the verylong run. To the best of our knowledge, this also appears to be one of the ﬁrst
examples in the evolutionaryliterature where a non-singleton recurrent class turns out to
be stochasticallystable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and basic deﬁnitions.
Section 3 introduces the unperturbed recontracting process. Its perturbed version with
mistakes is found in Section 4. Section 5 contains our result when preferences are strict.
Section 6 focuses on economies with non-singleton indiﬀerence sets, and goes through a
series of examples. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Housing Economy
A housing economy is a 4-tuple E≡  N,H,( i,e i)i∈N ,w h e r eN is a ﬁnite set of indi-
viduals, H is a ﬁnite set of houses with |H| = |N|, and for each individual i ∈ N,  i
is a complete and transitive preference relation over H,w i t h i denoting its associated
strict preference relation and ∼i its indiﬀerence relation. Finally, (ei)i∈N is the individual
endowment.
A coalition S of agents is a non-emptysubset of N. The complement coalition of S,
N\S, will be sometimes denoted by −S.Afeasible allocation for coalition S is a one-to-
one function that assigns to the coalition S a redistribution of the coalitional endowment
(ei)i∈S. Denote the set of feasible allocations for coalition S by AS. We simplywrite A for
AN.
An allocation x ∈ A is individually rational if there is no individual i ∈ N for whom
ei  i xi.
3An allocation x ∈ A is a core allocation if there is no coalition S and no feasible
allocation for S, y ∈ AS, such that yi  i xi for all i ∈ S.
An allocation x ∈ A is a strong core allocation if there is no coalition S and no feasible
allocation for S, y ∈ AS, such that yi  i xi for all i ∈ S and yj  j xj for some j ∈ S.
An allocation x ∈ A is a Walrasian allocation if there exists p ∈ IR
H
+\{0} such that for
all i ∈ N and for all h ∈ H, h  i xi implies ph >p ei.
It has been shown (see Shapleyand Scarf (1974)) that an allocation x is Walrasian if
and onlyif it can be obtained as a result of trading cy cles. That is, there exists a partition
of the set of agents {S1,S 2,...,S m} such that:
xS1 ∈ AS1,a n df o re v e r yj ∈ S1, xj  j xi for every i ∈ N;a n d
for every k =2 ,...,m, xSk ∈ ASk,a n df o re v e r yj ∈ Sk, xj  j xi for every i ∈ Sk∪...S m.
In other words, the agents in S1 redistribute their endowments and get their most preferred
houses; the agents in S2 redistribute their endowments and get their most preferred houses
out of the endowments of S2 ∪ ...S m,e t c .
Given a housing economy, we shall deﬁne a perturbed Markov process as in Kandori,
Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). The states of the process are the allocations
of the housing economy. In each period a coalition of agents is selected at random and the
system moves from one state to another when the matched agents trade. In the unper-
turbed Markov process M0 of Section 3, agents do not make mistakes in their coalitional
meetings: theytrade if and onlyif there is a strictlybeneﬁcial coalitional recontracting
opportunity. In the perturbed process M  of Section 4, agents will make mistakes with a
small probability, and sign a contract with a coalition even when they do not improve as
ar e s u l t .
It is often the case that an unperturbed Markov process (and it will certainlybe the
case for M0) has manystationarydistributions. On the other hand for all   ∈ (0,1), the
perturbed process M  is ergodic, which implies that it has a unique stationarydistribution.
Denote the unique stationarydistribution of M  by µ . This stationarydistribution, which
is independent of the initial state, represents the proportion of time that the system will
spend on each of its states in the long run. It also represents the long run probabilitythat
the process will be at each allocation. In order to deﬁne the stochasticallystable states,
we check the behavior of the stationarydistribution µ  as   goes to 0. It is known that
lim →0 µ  exists and further it is one of the stationarydistributions of the unperturbed
process M0.T h e stochastically stable states of the system M  are deﬁned to be those
states that are assigned positive probabilitybythis limit distribution. We are interested
in these allocations because theyare the one that are expected to be observed in the long
run “most of the time.”
43 An Unperturbed Trading Process
Consider the following unperturbed Markov process M0, adapted from Feldman (1974)
and Green (1974). In each period t, if the system is at the allocation x(t), all coalitions
are chosen with arbitrary, but positive, probability. Suppose coalitionS is chosen.
(i) If there exists an S-allocation yS ∈ AS such that yi  i xi(t) for all i ∈ S, the coalition
moves to each such y with positive probabilityin that period. Then, the new state
is either
x(t +1 )=( yS,x −S(t)) if x−S(t) ∈ A−S,o r
x(t +1 )=( yS,e −S)i fx−S(t) / ∈ A−S.
(ii) Otherwise, x(t +1 )=x(t).
The interpretation of the process is one of coalitional recontracting. Following a status
quo, a coalition can form and modifythe status quo if all members of the coalition improve
as a result. When this happens, upon coalition S forming, the complement coalition N\S
continues to have the same houses as before if this is feasible for them. Otherwise, N\S
breaks apart and each of the agents in it receives his individual endowment. If after
coalition S gets together, all its agents cannot ﬁnd anystrict improvement, the original
status quo persists.
It is clear that the absorbing states of this unperturbed process are preciselythe core
allocations of the economy. However, the absorbing states are not the only recurrent classes
of M0, as shown bythe following example.
Example 1 Let N = {1,2,3} and denote by( e1,e 2,e 3) the individual endowment alloca-
tion. Let the agents’ preferences be as follows:
e3  1 e2  1 e1;
e1  2 e3  2 e2;
e2  3 e1  3 e3.
Consider the following three allocations: x =( e1,e 3,e 2), y =( e2,e 1,e 3)a n dz =
(e3,e 2,e 1). These three allocations constitute a recurrent class: if the system is at x,t h e
state changes onlywhen coalition {1,2} meets, yielding y.A ty, the system can move only
to z, when coalition {1,3} meets. Finally, the system will move out of z onlybygoing
back to x, when coalition {2,3} meets.
Note that the unique Walrasian allocation w =( e3,e 1,e 2) also constitutes a singleton
recurrent class.
5We can prove the following result, characterizing the recurrent classes of the unper-
turbed process M0:
Proposition 1 The recurrent classes of the unperturbed process M0 take the following
two forms:
(i) Singleton recurrent classes, each of which containing each core allocation.
(ii) Non-singleton recurrent classes: in each of them, the allocations are individually
rational but are not core allocations.
Proof: It is clear that each core allocation constitutes an absorbing state of M0,a n dt h a t
everyabsorbing state must be a core allocation.
For the second form of recurrent class, note that, byconstruction of the sy stem, no
state in a recurrent class can ever be non-individuallyrational: if at state x, ei  i xi,t h e
coalition {i} is chosen with positive probability. Then, the system moves to the individual
endowment e, never to return to a non-individuallyrational allocation. It is also clear that
each of the states in the recurrent class cannot be absorbing, i.e., a core allocation.
Thus, each core allocation is an absorbing state of the unperturbed Markov process
M0, and in principle there maybe additional non-singleton recurrent classes, as that in
Example 1. Note also that as soon as the economyhas more than one core allocation, the
system M0 has manystationarydistributions.
4 A Perturbed Trading Process
Next we introduce the perturbed Markov process M  for an arbitrary   ∈ (0,1), a per-
turbation of M0. Suppose the state of the system is the allocation x and that coalition
S meets. We shall saythat a member of S makes a “mistake” when he signs a contract
that either leaves him indiﬀerent to the same house he alreadyhad or he becomes worse
oﬀ upon signing. Each of the members of S maymake one of these “mistakes” with a
small probability, as a function of  >0, independentlyof the others. Speciﬁcally , for a
small ﬁxed   ∈ (0,1), we shall postulate that an agent’s probabilityof agreeing to a new
allocation that leaves him indiﬀerent is  , while the probabilityof agreeing to an allocation
that makes him worse oﬀ is  λ for a suﬃcientlylarge positive integer λ. That is, the latter
mistakes are much less likelythan the former, while both are rare events in the agent’s
decision-making process.
Before we deﬁne the perturbed process, we need some notation and deﬁnitions. Con-
sider an arbitrarypair of allocations z and z .L e tT(z,z ) ⊆ 2N\{∅} be the set of coalitions
such that, if chosen, can induce the perturbed system to transit from z to z  in one step.
Note that it is always the case that N ∈ T(z,z ) for any z and z .
6In the direct transition from z to z  and for each S ∈ T(z,z ), deﬁne the following
numbers:
nI(S,z,z











In the perturbed Markov process M  the transition probabilities are calculated as
follows. Suppose that the system is in allocation z. All coalitions are chosen with a ﬁxed
positive probability. Assume coalitionS is chosen. If S/ ∈ T(z,z ), then S moves to z  with
probability0. If S ∈ T(z,z )a n dn(S,z,z ) > 0, then coalition S agrees to move to z  with
probability  n(S,z,z).I fS ∈ T(z,z )a n dn(S,z,z ) = 0, coalition S moves to those z  with
some probabilitybigger than some δ>0.
For all   ∈ (0,1) small enough, the system M  is a well-deﬁned irreducible Markov
process. As such, it has a unique invariant distribution. This distribution gives the prob-
abilitythat the sy stem is in each of the allocations in the long run. We are interested
in the limit of the corresponding invariant distributions as   tends to 0. More precisely,
we are interested in the allocations that are assigned positive probabilitybythis limiting
distribution. These particular allocations are called the stochasticallystable allocations.
In order to obtain our results, we will use the techniques developed byKandori, Mailath
and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). We need some more deﬁnitions. These concepts will
be used in the proof of our main result and in the analysis of the examples of Section 6.
Note that bythe deﬁnition of the perturbed Markov process M , for everytwo allo-
cations z and z , the direct transition probability µz,z( ) converges to the limit transition
probability µz,z(0) of the unperturbed process M0 at an exponential rate. In particu-
lar, for all allocations z,z  such that µz,z = 0, the convergence is at a rate r(z,z )=
minS∈T(z,z) λnW(S,z,z )+nI(S,z,z ). We call the value r(z,z )t h eresistance of the direct
transition from allocation z to allocation z .
For anytwo allocations z,z ,a( z,z )-path is a sequence of allocations ξ =( i0,i 1,...,i n)
such that i0 = z, in = z .T h eresistance of the path ξ is the sum of the resistances of its
transitions.
Let Z0 = {E0,E1,...,EQ} be the set of recurrent classes of the unperturbed process
M0 and consider the complete directed graph with vertex set Z0, which is denoted by
Γ. We want to deﬁne the resistance of each one of the edges in this graph. For this, let
Ei and Ej be two elements of Z0.T h e resistance of the edge (Ei,Ej)i nΓ ,r(Ei,Ej),
is the minimum resistance over all the resistances of the (zi,zj)-paths, where zi ∈ Ei
and zj ∈ Ej. A spanning tree rooted at Ej is a set of Q directed edges such that from
everyrecurrent class diﬀerent from Ej, there is a unique directed path in the tree to Ej.
The resistance of a spanning tree rooted at Ej is the sum of the resistances of its edges.
The stochastic potential of the recurrent class Ej is the minimum resistance attained by
a spanning tree rooted at Ej. As shown in Young (1993), the set of stochasticallystable
7states of the perturbed process M  consists of those states included in the recurrent classes
with minimum stochastic potential.
5 Economies with Singleton Indiﬀerence Sets
In this section we shall assume that for everyagent i ∈ N the preference relation  i is
antisymmetric, which implies that all indiﬀerence sets are singletons. Making such an
assumption, Roth and Postlewaite (1977) proved the following result:
Lemma 1 Let E be a housing economywhere all preferences are strict. Then,
(i) There is a unique Walrasian allocation w.
(ii) The allocation w is the onlystrong core allocation.
(iii) For everyallocation x ∈ A, x  = w, there exists a coalition S such that wS is feasible
for S and satisﬁes wi  i xi for all i ∈ S and wj  j xj for some j ∈ S.
Lemma 1 will be useful in proving our ﬁrst main result, to which we turn now.
Theorem 1 Let E be a housing economywhere all preferences are strict. Suppose that
λ>|N|−2. Then, the unique stochasticallystable allocation of the perturbed process
M  is the Walrasian allocation w.
Proof: Since when |N| = 2, the core consists of the singleton w and there are onlytwo
feasible allocations, it is clear that the statement holds, byProposition 1. Thus, assume
that |N|≥3. Recall that we denote the set of recurrent classes of the unperturbed
process M0 by {E0,E1,...,EQ},a n dl e tE0 be the singleton recurrent class containing
the Walrasian allocation w (again recall Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, parts (i) and (ii)).
Denote the stochastic potential of E0 bysp( E0). We show that the stochastic potential of
anyother recurrent class Ek, k =1 ,...,Q, is greater than sp(E0).
Let Ek  = E0 be an arbitraryrecurrent class. Consider a Ek-tree of stochastic potential
sp(Ek). Introduce in it the following two modiﬁcations:
(i) Delete the edge that connects the class E0 to its successor Ej on the path to Ek.
(ii) Add a directed edge going from Ek to E0.
Note that the resulting graph is an E0-tree. Moreover, the resistance of this new E0-tree
r(T)e q u a l s






8To ﬁnish the proof, we show in the following two lemmas that r(E0,Ej) >r (Ek,E0).
This means that we would have constructed an E0-tree whose resistance is less than sp(Ek),
therebyshowing that sp( E0) < sp(Ek).
Lemma 2 Consider the edge E0 → Ej that is deleted from the Ek-tree. Then, r(E0,Ej) ≥
λ.
Proof: Consider a path that attains the resistance r(E0,Ej), of the edge that connect
the Walrasian allocation to the recurrent class Ej,a n dl e tx1 be the ﬁrst allocation in this
path.
We claim that, in the direct transition from w to x1, at least one agent becomes worse
oﬀ. Let the coalition involved in this transition be S1. If it were the case that x1
i  i wi
for every i ∈ S1, we would be saying that w is not a strong core allocation, contradicting
Lemma 1, part (ii). Therefore, at least one agent becomes worse oﬀ in this direct transition,
from which it follows that r(E0,Ej) ≥ λ.
Lemma 3 Consider the edge Ek → E0 that is added to the Ek-tree. Then, r(Ek,E0) ≤
|N|−2.
Proof: We calculate an upper bound for r(Ek,E0) as follows. Let x0 ∈ Ek. ByLemma
1, part (iii), there exists a coalition S such that (wi)i∈S ∈ AS, wi  i xi for all i ∈ S and
wj  j xj for some j ∈ S. In the next paragraphs, we refer to S as one of the maximal (in
the sense of set inclusion) such coalitions . We can have two cases.
Case 1: S = N. In this case, the maximum possible resistance associated with the
direct transition from x to w is (|N|−2), i.e., the one given bythe highest number of
indiﬀerences that can occur in N.
Case 2: S  = N. This case admits two subcases:
Subcase 2.1: Suppose that x−S / ∈ A−S. Then, when coalition S meets, the system
moves to y =( wS,e −S) with positive probability. The resistance of this transition cannot
be greater than (|N|−2) because, within S,o n ec a nh a v ea tm o s t( |S|−2) indiﬀerences.
B u tn o t et h a tf r o my, the system can move to w with a resistance no bigger than |N\S|−2:
if necessary, the coalition T ⊆ N\S of agents who are not receiving their Walrasian house
at y will be partitioned in subsets (according to the trading cycles), each of which to
perform the necessarytrade so that the ﬁnal result is w. Therefore, since |S|≤| N|−2,
the number of indiﬀerences found in this transition is at most (|N|−4).
Subcase 2.2: x−S ∈ A−S. In this case, coalition S meets and the system moves to
y =( wS,x −S) with positive probability. But then, by our choice of S and Lemma 1,
part (iii) applied to the subeconomyconsisting of agents N\S, it must necessarilybe the
case that x−S = w−S. Therefore, N\S = ∅ because otherwise S would not be a maximal
blocking coalition. But in this case S = N and we are back in case 1.
9Therefore, the resistance of the transition Ek → E0 is bounded above bythe maximum
of the two expressions involved in the two cases analyzed, which is (|N|−2).
In consequence, it follows from our assumption on the size of λ that r(Ek,E0) <
r(E0,Ej), which concludes the proof.
6 Economies with Non-Singleton Indiﬀerence Sets
In this section we explore how the stochastic process of recontracting with mistakes, M ,
performs over the class of economies that allow non-singleton indiﬀerence sets for some
agents. Over this larger class of economies, recall that Proposition 1 still holds. However,
the conclusions of Lemma 1 do not extend. First, although existence is guaranteed, there
maybe multiple Walrasian allocations. Second, the strong core mayalso contain multiple
allocations, while it maysometimes be empty . And third, the “global dominance” property
of Walrasian allocations as speciﬁed in Lemma 1, part (iii), is also lost.
In economies with onlystrict preferences, the Walrasian allocation correspondence and
the strong core coincide, and under our assumption on λ, the same allocation is the onlyone
that passes the test of stochastic stability. It is convenient, therefore, to examine the larger
class of economies to disentangle the diﬀerent forces and understand what conclusions
emerge from our dynamic analysis based on agents’ mistakes. The trading system with
mistakes gives rise to complicated dynamics, and no general result of equivalence can be
established.
We shall present three examples. We arrange them byincreasing diﬃcultyand rele-
vance. Indeed, we regard Example 4 as the other main result of the paper. In all three
examples, one agent has a completelyﬂat indiﬀerence map, but this is onlyfor simplicity
of exposition. Also, in the examples we shall use the notation z →r
S z  to express that the
transition of least resistance from z to z  takes place through coalition S at a resistance r.
We begin byshowing that the set of stochasticallystable allocations is not the strong
core. As we just pointed out, the strong core maybe emptyin these economies, while
stochastic stabilityalway s selects at least one allocation; but even when the strong core is
not empty, one can generate examples where it does not coincide with the set of stochas-
ticallystable states of M .
Example 2 In this example, a non-emptystrong core is strictlycontained in the set of
stochasticallystable allocations. Let N = {1,2} and agents’ preferences be described as
follows:
e1 ∼1 e2;
e1  2 e2.
Both allocations are Walrasian and onlythe allocation resulting from trade is in the
strong core. Note that both allocations are stochasticallystable: ( e1,e 2) →1
N (e2,e 1)
and (e2,e 1) →1
{1} (e1,e 2).
10The next example shows that the set of stochasticallystable allocations maybe a strict
subset of the strong core and of the set of Walrasian allocations.
Example 3 Let N = {1,2,3} and the agents’ preferences be given by:
e1 ∼1 e2 ∼1 e3;
e1 ∼2 e3  2 e2;
e1 ∼3 e2  3 e3.
In this economy, all allocations except the initial endowment allocation are Walrasian and
belong to the core. The strong core consists of the following three allocations: (e2,e 3,e 1),
(e3,e 1,e 2)a n d( e1,e 3,e 2).
The unique stochasticallystable allocation is x =( e1,e 3,e 2). To see that x is the
onlyallocation with minimum stochastic potential, one can construct one such x-tree as
follows. First, we note that the onlyrecurrent classes of M0 are the ﬁve absorbing states
corresponding to each Walrasian allocation. Next, note that to go from (e2,e 3,e 1)t ox can
be done with a resistance of 1 (onlyone indiﬀerence): ( e2,e 3,e 1) →1
{1} (e1,e 2,e 3) →0
{2,3} x.
The same goes for the transition (e3,e 1,e 2)t ox:( e3,e 1,e 2) →1
{1} (e1,e 2,e 3) →0
{2,3} x.A s
for the other transitions, we have (e3,e 2,e 1) →1
{2,3} x and (e2,e 1,e 3) →1
{2,3} x. Therefore,
the resistance of this x-tree is 4 and one cannot build a cheaper tree than that. On the
other hand, to get out of x, the resistance will always be at least 2, i.e., at least two
indiﬀerences, which implies that, in constructing a tree for anyof the other recurrent
classes, its resistance must be at least 5.
The next example shows how diﬀerent the conclusions one reaches in the analysis of
cooperation with mistakes maybe from those of standard cooperative game theory . It
turns out that in a dynamic model where agents may make mistakes in decision-making,
the core maynot agree with the set of states that are visited bythe process a positive
proportion of time. In contrast, some non-core allocations mayfair better in this sense
than some core allocations.
Example 4 7 This example, an outgrowth of Example 1, shows that a cycle of non-core
allocations maybe stochasticallystable, at the same time as some core allocations having
higher stochastic potential. Let N = {1,2,3,4}, and the agents’ preferences be as follows:
e4  1 e3  1 e2  1 e1;
7As communicated to us by Bob Aumann, a similar story is told in the Talmud: there is a cycle of
three two-person coalitions improving the status quo. The three players involved in the cycle are the two
wives of a man and a third party who buys the man’s estate. The cycle occurs after the man died and left
his estate. The diseased agent naturally corresponds to our agent 4, who has a ﬂat indiﬀerence map. See
also Binmore (1985) for a more recent related problem.
11e1  2 e3  2 e2  2 e4;
e2  3 e1  3 e3  3 e4;
e1 ∼4 e2 ∼4 e3 ∼4 e4.
Consider the following three allocations: x =( e1,e 3,e 2,e 4), y =( e2,e 1,e 3,e 4)a n d
z =( e3,e 2,e 1,e 4). Since agent 4 cannot strictlyimprove, he cannot be part of anyblocking
coalition. In fact, as in Example 1, these three allocations constitute a recurrent class: if
the system is at x, the state changes onlywhen coalition {1,2} meets, yielding y.A ty,
the system can move only to z, when coalition {1,3} meets. Finally, the system will move





The core consists of the following ﬁve allocations: c1 =( e3,e 1,e 2,e 4), c2 =( e4,e 1,e 2,e 3),
c3 =( e4,e 1,e 3,e 2), c4 =( e4,e 3,e 1,e 2), c5 =( e4,e 3,e 2,e 1).
It is easyto see that these ﬁve absorbing states –i.e., the core allocations– and the cy cle
are the onlyrecurrent classes of the unperturbed sy stem: the 12 allocations where e4 is
allocated to either agent 2 or agent 3 are not even individuallyrational. And from each of
the remaining four allocations, one gets to one of the alreadyidentiﬁed recurrent classes
with 0 resistance:
a1 =( e1,e 2,e 3,e 4) →0
{1,2,3} c1, a2 =( e2,e 3,e 1,e 4) →0
{1,2,3} c1, a3 =( e4,e 2,e 1,e 3) →0
{2,3}
x, a4 =( e4,e 2,e 3,e 1) →0
{2,3} c5.
Let E = {x,y,z} be the non-singleton recurrent class consisting of non-core allocations.
Next, we construct an E-tree and show that it has minimum stochastic potential. This











{1,2} y, forj =2 ,3,4,5.
Therefore, the class E has minimum stochastic potential.
Note also that there are four Walrasian allocations: c1, c2, c3 and c5.T h u s ,t h ee x a m p l e
also shows that there are non-Walrasian stochasticallystable allocations.
However, apart from E, the onlystochasticallystable allocations are the four Walrasian
allocations c1, c2, c3 and c5: there are allocations in the core that are not visited in the
long run but a zero proportion of time. In particular, note how it takes at least two
indiﬀerences to get out of other recurrent classes to go to c4. This implies that c4 cannot










{1,2} (y ∈ E), forj =2 ,3,5,




1. Theorem 1 uses the “global dominance” propertyof the Walrasian allocation, as speciﬁed
in Lemma 1, part (iii). Although the models are verydiﬀerent, this dominance of the
Walrasian allocation resembles the main driving force of the result in Vega-Redondo (1997).
This paper proposes an evolutionaryprocess based on imitation, and its Walrasian result
relies on the fact that if a ﬁrm produces the competitive output in a symmetric oligopoly,
its proﬁt is always higher than that of those ﬁrms that produce any other output level.
2. Note that the suﬃcient condition on the cost of a serious mistake, λ>|N|−2, used
to obtain Theorem 1, is jeopardized when |N| grows. Thus, for a given speciﬁcation of λ,
the system may get stuck at other allocations because the number of indiﬀerences required
to abandon a non-Walrasian allocation to go to the Walrasian allocation grows. If one ﬁxes
λ, making the economylarge is an obstacle to the Walrasian result: other allocations could
also be visited bythe process a positive fraction of time in the long run. This contrasts
with the core convergence literature, based on the existence of more blocking coalitions in
large economies.
3. Along the same lines, if indiﬀerences are present in the economy, the examples
in Section 6 demonstrate that stochastic stabilitymayy ield a varietyof patterns, and
that the long run prediction maybe compatible with the presence of market frictions –
non-Walrasian allocations. In particular, Example 4 suggest that the core maynot be
telling the whole storyof coalitional stabilityin a model where mistakes are allowed, as a
complement to one of the central messages of cooperative game theory.
4. Our results are robust if the transition rule in the unperturbed process is that of
coalitional weak blocking, instead of the strict blocking speciﬁed in M0. That is, coalition
S moves from xS to yS ∈ AS if yi  i xi for every i ∈ S and yi  i xi for some i ∈ S.
A version of Proposition 1 is obtained: the recurrent classes of this new unperturbed
process are of two kinds: singletons, corresponding to each strong core allocation, and
non-singletons consisting of individuallyrational allocations that are not in the strong
core. With all preferences being strict, Theorem 1 is still obtained thanks to the “global
dominance” of the Walrasian allocation, but no assumption on λ is required, because in
this new process indiﬀerences constitute no friction if theyare accompanied of at least
one strict improvement in the coalition. Finally, one can still sustain stochastically stable
cy cles in economies with indiﬀerences: one easywayto see this is to consider an example
with an emptystrong core.
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